[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] ARGERSINGER
v.
[3] HAMLIN, SHERIFF
[4] No. 70-5015
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1972.SCT.107 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[5] Date Decided: June 12, 1972
[6] Reargued February 28, 1972.
[7] SYLLABUS
[8] The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the
assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the offense or by
whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused may be deprived of
his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or
misdemeanor, in which he was denied the assistance of counsel. In this
case, the Supreme Court of Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an
indigent who was tried for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to
six months, a $ 1,000 fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence,
had no right to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right
extends only to trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than
six months imprisonment." Pp. 27-40.
[9] CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
[10] APPELLATE PANEL:
[11] Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Brennan,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Douglas and Stewart, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 40. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the
result, post, p. 41. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
result, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 44.
[12] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUSTICE DOUGLAS
[13] Petitioner, an indigent, was charged in Florida with carrying a
concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six
months, a $ 1,000 fine, or both. The trial was to a judge, and
petitioner was unrepresented by counsel. He was sentenced to serve 90
days in jail, and brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida
Supreme Court, alleging that, being deprived of his right to counsel, he
was unable as an indigent layman properly to raise and present to the
trial court good and sufficient defenses to the charge for which he
stands convicted. The Florida Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision,
in ruling on the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, as respects the right to trial
by jury and held that the right to court-appointed counsel extends onlyto trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months
imprisonment." 236 So. 2d 442, 443.*fn1
[14] The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which we granted.
401 U.S. 908. We reverse.
[15] The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations has been
made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment (see
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14; Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257), provides
specified standards for "all criminal prosecutions."
[16] One is the requirement of a "public trial." In re Oliver, supra,
held that the right to a "public trial" was applicable to a state
proceeding even though only a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U.S., at
272.
[17] Another guarantee is the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Still another, the right of confrontation.
Pointer v. Texas, supra. And another, compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in one's favor. Washington v. Texas, supra. We have never
limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but serious offenses.
[18] In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have held that due
process requires that the accused have the assistance of counsel for his
defense, that he be confronted with the witnesses against him, and that
he have the right to a speedy and public trial." 388 U.S., at 18.
Respecting the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, "It is simply not
arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of a petty offense
may be held in secret, or without notice to the accused of the charges,
or that in such cases the defendant has no right to confront his
accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf."
Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685,
705 (1968).
[19] District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, illustrates the
point. There, the offense was engaging without a license in the
business of dealing in second-hand property, an offense punishable by a
fine of $ 300 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days. The Court held
that the offense was a "petty" one and could be tried without a jury.
But the conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered, because the
trial court had prejudicially restricted the right of cross-examination,
a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
[20] The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was limited by Duncan v.
Louisiana, supra, to trials where the potential punishment was
imprisonment for six months or more. But, as the various opinions in
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, make plain, the right to trial by jury
has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to a
judge alone. As stated in Duncan :
[21] "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to
the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single
judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the
Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the
exercise of official power -- a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal
Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in
this insistence upon community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States."
391 U.S., at 156.
[22] While there is historical support for limiting the "deep
commitment" to trial by jury to "serious criminal cases,"*fn2 there is
no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of
counsel:
[23] "Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony
was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions
which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time parties in
civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the
full assistance of counsel. . . .
[24] . . . .
[25] "[It] appears that in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies
the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under
consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel
fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two
instances the right was limited to capital offenses or to the more
serious crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60, 64-65.
[26] The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond
its common-law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the
Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate
that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty
offenses wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be
provided. See James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 331-332, n. 9.
[27] We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for
crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried
without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.
[28] The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very
existence of a fair trial. The Court in Powell v. Alabama, supra, at
68-69 -- a capital case -- said:
[29] "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true
of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
[30] In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial. But we did not so limit the
need of the accused for a lawyer. We said:
[31] "In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect
the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money
hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread
belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him." 372 U.S., at 344.*fn3
[32] Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their rationale
has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his
liberty. Powell and Gideon suggest that there are certain fundamental
rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such as
In re Oliver, supra, where the penalty is 60 days' imprisonment:
[33] "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense -- a right to his day in
court -- are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to
offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." 333 U.S., at 273
(emphasis supplied).
[34] The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair
trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced
that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually
leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than
when a person can be sent off for six months or more. See, e. g., Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514; Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199;
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87.
[35] The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often bristle with
thorny constitutional questions. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156.
[36] In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, dealt with juvenile delinquency and an
offense which, if committed by an adult, would have carried a fine of $
5 to $ 50 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months (id., at
29), but which when committed by a juvenile might lead to his detention
in a state institution until he reached the age of 21. Id., at 36-37. We
said (id., at 36) that "the juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he
has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child 'requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,'"
citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S., at 69. The premise of Gault is that
even in prosecutions for offenses less serious than felonies, a fair
trial may require the presence of a lawyer.
[37] Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty
plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony
cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he
is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or
prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
[38] In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases,*fn4 far greater in
number than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy
dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967), states:
[39] "For example, until legislation last year increased the number
of judges, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions had four
judges to process the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 petty offenses and an
equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable consequence of
volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with
the movement of cases. The calendar is long, speed often is substituted
for care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise too often is
substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to
the individual defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting the
facts at trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or determining how
to deal with him after conviction. The frequent result is futility and
failure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed:
[40] "'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he finds great
numbers of defendants being processed by harassed and overworked
officials. Police have more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they take their initial
looks at the files. Defense lawyers appear having had no more than time
for hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face long calendars
with the certain knowledge that their calendars tomorrow and the next
day will be, if anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to
dispose of the cases.
[41] "'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the
criminal process, there is scant regard for them as individuals. They
are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their
way. The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.
[42] "'Very little such observation of the administration of criminal
justice in operation is required to reach the conclusion that it suffers
from basic ills.'"
[43] That picture is seen in almost every report. "The misdemeanor
trial is characterized by insufficient and frequently irresponsible
preparation on the part of the defense, the prosecution, and the court.
Everything is rush, rush." Hellerstein, The Importance of the
Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid Brief Case 151,
152 (1970).
[44] There is evidence of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor
defendants from this "assembly-line justice." One study concluded that
"misdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to
emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants
who face similar charges without counsel." American Civil Liberties
Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970).
[45] We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with
misdemeanor and petty*fn5 offenses often require the presence of counsel
to insure the accused a fair trial. MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that
these problems are raised even in situations where there is no prospect
of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not consider the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of
liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact
sentenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S., at
73, "the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom
be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well
result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation."*fn6
[46] We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial.*fn7
[47] That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with which we
agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414,
418:
[48] "We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has
been denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions,
including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a
jail sentence."*fn8
[49] We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state courts how to
manage their affairs but only to make clear the federal constitutional
requirement. How crimes should be classified is largely a state
matter.*fn9 The fact that traffic charges technically fall within the
category of "criminal prosecutions" does not necessarily mean that many
of them will be brought into the class*fn10 where imprisonment actually
occurs.
[50] The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice states:
[51] "As a matter of sound judicial administration it is preferable
to disregard the characterization of the offense as felony, misdemeanor
or traffic offense. Nor is it adequate to require the provision of
defense services for all offenses which carry a sentence to jail or
prison. Often, as a practical matter, such sentences are rarely if ever
imposed for certain types of offenses, so that for all intents and
purposes the punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the standard
seeks to distinguish those classes of cases in which there is real
likelihood that incarceration may follow conviction from those types in
which there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that the standard
does not recommend a determination of the need for counsel in terms of
the facts of each particular case; it draws a categorical line at those
types of offenses for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical
possibility." Providing Defense Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968).
[52] Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even
though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the
offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the
accused before the trial starts.
[53] The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling.
But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's
liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of "the guiding hand of
counsel" so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy.
[54] Reversed.
[55] CASE RESOLUTION
[56] 236 So. 2d 442, reversed.
IN AGREEMENT
[57] contd MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring.
[58] I join the opinion of the Court and add only an observation upon
its discussion of legal resources, ante, at 37 n. 7. Law students as
well as practicing attorneys may provide an important source of legal
representation for the indigent. The Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility informs us that more than 125 of the
country's 147 accredited law schools have established clinical programs
in which faculty-supervised students aid clients in a variety of civil
and criminal matters.* CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 2. These programs
supplement practice rules enacted in 38 States authorizing students to
practice law under prescribed conditions. Ibid. Like the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Rule (1969), most of these
regulations permit students to make supervised court appearances as
defense counsel in criminal cases. CLEPR, State Rules Permitting the
Student Practice of Law: Comparisons and Comments 13 (1971). Given the
huge increase in law school enrollments over the past few years, see
Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146 (1972),
I think it plain that law students can be expected to make a significant
contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of
the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today's decision.
[59] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the result.
[60] I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of the Court
and with MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S appraisal of the problems. Were I able to
confine my focus solely to the burden that the States will have to bear
in providing counsel, I would be inclined, at this stage of the
development of the constitutional right to counsel, to conclude that
there is much to commend drawing the line at penalties in excess of six
months' confinement. Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities
in any approach that allows confinement for any period without the aid
of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter. The
issues that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty offense or a
misdemeanor may often be simpler than those involved in a felony trial
and yet be beyond the capability of a layman, especially when he is
opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There is little ground, therefore,
to assume that a defendant, unaided by counsel, will be any more able
adequately to defend himself against the lesser charges that may involve
confinement than more serious charges. Appeal from a conviction after an
uncounseled trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since
the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial
record.
[61] Trial judges sitting in petty and misdemeanor cases -- and
prosecutors -- should recognize exactly what will be required by today's
decision. Because no individual can be imprisoned unless he is
represented by counsel, the trial judge and the prosecutor will have to
engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether
there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted,
the trial judge will sentence him to a jail term. The judge can preserve
the option of a jail sentence only by offering counsel to any defendant
unable to retain counsel on his own. This need to predict will place a
new load on courts already overburdened and already compelled to deal
with far more cases in one day than is reasonable and proper. Yet the
prediction is not one beyond the capacity of an experienced judge, aided
as he should be by the prosecuting officer. As to jury cases, the latter
should be prepared to inform the judge as to any prior record of the
accused, the general nature of the case against the accused, including
any use of violence, the severity of harm to the victim, the impact on
the community, and the other factors relevant to the sentencing process.
Since the judge ought to have some degree of such information after
judgment of guilt is determined, ways can be found in the more serious
misdemeanor cases when jury trial is not waived to make it available to
the judge before trial.** This will not mean a full "presentence"
report on every defendant in every case before the jury passes on guilt,
but a prosecutor should know before trial whether he intends to urge a
jail sentence, and if he does he should be prepared to aid the court
with the factual and legal basis for his view on that score.
[62] This will mean not only that more defense counsel must be
provided, but also additional prosecutors and better facilities for
securing information about the accused as it bears on the probability of
a decision to confine.
[63] The step we take today should cause no surprise to the legal
profession. More than five years ago the profession, speaking through
the American Bar Association in a Report on Standards Relating to
Providing Defense Services, determined that society's goal should be
"that the system for providing counsel and facilities for the defense be
as good as the system which society provides for the prosecution."
American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Providing Defense Services 1 (Approved Draft 1968). The ABA was not
addressing itself, as we must in this case, to the constitutional
requirement but only to the broad policy issue. Elsewhere in the Report
the ABA stated that:
[64] "The fundamental premise of these standards is that
representation by counsel is desirable in criminal cases both from the
viewpoint of the defendant and of society." Id., at 3.
[65] After considering the same general factors involved in the issue
we decide today, the ABA Report specifically concluded that:
[66] "Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for
offenses punishable by loss of liberty, except those types of offenses
for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed, regardless of
their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or otherwise." Id., § 4.1,
pp. 37-38.
[67] In a companion ABA Report on Standards Relating to the
Prosecution Function and the Defense Function the same basic theme
appears in the positive standard cast in these terms:
[68] "Counsel for the accused is an essential component of the
administration of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to hear
a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the
judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and
counsel for the accused." Id., at 153 (Approved Draft 1968).
[69] The right to counsel has historically been an evolving concept.
The constitutional requirements with respect to the issue have dated in
recent times from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Part of this evolution has been
expressed in the policy prescriptions of the legal profession itself,
and the contributions of the organized bar and individual lawyers --
such as those appointed to represent the indigent defendants in the
Powell and Gideon cases -- have been notable. The holding of the Court
today may well add large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed,
but the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens
placed on it.
[70] contd MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
concurring in the result.
[71] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that the States
were required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
furnish counsel to all indigent defendants charged with felonies.1 The
question before us today is whether an indigent defendant convicted of
an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment, a
fine of $ 1,000, or both, and sentenced to 90 days in jail, is entitled
as a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of appointed
counsel. The broader question is whether the Due Process Clause requires
that an indigent charged with a state petty offense2 be afforded the
right to appointed counsel.
[72] In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed
that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to
appointed counsel, but, by a vote of four to three, it limited that
right to offenses punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.3 The
state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed the lead of this
Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and in the subsequent
case of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), which was decided
shortly after the opinion below, in which the Court held that the due
process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limited to
cases in which the offense charged was punishable by more than six
months' imprisonment. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel
line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a right to
appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due process right to
a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a
nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled
to counsel.6