[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
[2] Thomas J. FORSYTHE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
[3] FAMILY COURT COMMISSIONER OF DANE COUNTY,
[4] Defendant-Respondent
[5] No. 84-833
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1986.WI.157 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[6] Date Decided: June 20, 1986
[7] Affirming 125 Wis. 2d 572, 373 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1985). Review
of an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed an
order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, entered on February 27,
1984, William F. Eich, Judge.
[8] APPELLATE PANEL:
[9] Bablitch, J. Louis J. Ceci, J. concurring.
[10] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE BABLITCH
[11] Thomas J. Forsythe, Jr., (Forsythe) maintains that he has an
absolute right, as a party to a postdivorce proceeding before the Family
Court Commissioner, Dane County (Commissioner), to record the entire
proceeding at his own expense. We recognize his right to record such a
proceeding, but conclude that exercise of this right is subject to the
commissioner's administrative authority. Because we hold that the family
court commissioner may limit the method or extent of a party's recording
of a proceeding, we uphold the decision of the court of appeals, which
affirmed the circuit court's order that Forsythe did not have an
absolute right to record proceedings before the commissioner.
[12] The sole issue for review is whether a party to a postjudgment
proceeding before a family court commissioner has an absolute right to
record the entire proceeding at the party's own expense.
[13] The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. On May 6,
1981, Forsythe appeared before an assistant family court commissioner in
a contested postdivorce proceeding related to child custody and contempt
of court. A court reporter whom he had hired accompanied him in the
hearing room and made a stenographic record of part of the proceeding.
His reporter did not record the entire proceeding because the
commissioner ordered her to stop recording for a period of time on
penalty of contempt. During the time when the reporter was not
recording, the parties discussed an issue related to visitation of their
children. After this discussion, the commissioner allowed the reporter
to resume recording. Forsythe then restated the discussion and the
proceeding continued.
[14] In an affidavit which he subsequently submitted to the circuit
court, the commissioner stated that he ordered the reporter to stop
recording ". . . in the belief that the parties were posturing for the
record and that the progress of the proceeding was thus being impeded. .
. ." He further stated that, in his opinion, the proceedings during the
unrecorded period ". . . were fruitful and resulted in substantial
progress . . ." which could not have been made if verbatim recording had
continued.
[15] Pursuant to sec. 806.04, Stats., Forsythe commenced an action
for declaratory judgment in the circuit court for Dane county. The
Commissioner did not contest the propriety of the declaratory judgment
action and we do not address this issue in our review. In a motion for
summary judgment, pursuant to sec. 802.08, Forsythe sought a declaratory
judgment stating that: "A litigant appearing at any proceeding before
the Family Court Commissioner has a right to make, at the litigant's own
expense, a stenographic record of the entire proceeding."
[16] After reviewing affidavits, depositions, and briefs which the
parties submitted, the circuit court determined that the issue was
appropriate for summary judgment. In a memorandum decision, the court
denied Forsythe's motion for summary judgment and dismissed his
complaint. On February 27, 1984, the court issued an order awarding
summary judgment to the Commissioner, pursuant to sec. 802.08(6), Stats.
[17] Forsythe appealed to the court of appeals, which summarily
affirmed the order of the circuit court in an unpublished decision. He
then appealed to this court and we granted his petition for review on
October 21, 1985.
[18] When reviewing a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, this
court will reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if the court
incorrectly decided a legal issue or if material facts are in dispute.
Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 666, 275 N.W.2d 676 (1979). The
parties do not dispute any material facts. For this reason, we address
only the question whether the circuit court incorrectly decided a legal
issue.
[19] Forsythe contends that he has an absolute right to make a
complete, verbatim recording at his own expense of any proceeding before
the family court commissioner to which he is a party. He maintains that
the commissioner may not restrict this right unless he uses a method of
recording which produces distracting sounds. Characterizing a recording
as a "record" for subsequent uses, he also argues that due process
requires the commissioner to permit him to make a "record" of the
proceeding in its entirety. According to Forsythe, whenever a party
intends to use a recording to prepare legal documents or arguments or
intends to rely on the recording in a subsequent proceeding, the party's
right to record becomes absolute, or is subject only to limitations
related to noise and distraction.
[20] Forsythe further argues that making a complete recording would
not unduly burden the commissioner or impair the efficiency of the
proceedings. Finally, he asserts that this court should not prohibit the
use of such a recording in subsequent judicial proceedings.
[21] In response, the Commissioner acknowledges that Forsythe has the
right to make some private record of the proceeding, but disputes that
this right is absolute. According to the Commissioner, the family court
commissioner has the authority to limit recording of proceedings if that
is necessary to maintain the order, decorum and efficiency of the
proceedings.
[22] This court recognizes that ". . . the right of public access to
the courts is not a right to be taken lightly . . ." and that it is rare
that a judge can appropriately limit public access to the courts. State
ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct., 115 Wis 2d 220, 242, 340
N.W.2d 460 (1983). In keeping with our longstanding tradition of
safeguarding the right of the public to access to court proceedings,
this court pursuant to its superintending authority over all courts now
also recognizes the right of parties to make records for their own use
of proceedings in which they participate. Of course, these private
recordings do not constitute an official record.
[23] Having established that parties may record proceedings before
the family court commissioner, we turn to the question of an appropriate
standard to guide the commissioner in those rare instances in which
restrictions on the right to record are justified. In doing so, we
exercise our superintending and administrative authority over all
courts, pursuant to art. VII, sec. 3 of the state constitution, set
forth below.*fn1 See also In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508,
517, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
[24] The appropriate standard for limitations on recordings of
proceedings before the family court commissioner must take into account
the responsibilities of the commissioner and the purposes of the
proceedings. First, the family court commissioner must administer the
proceedings, as authorized by sec. 767.13(1)(b), Stats. and the
applicable rules of the circuit court, set forth below.*fn2 In addition,
under ch. 767, the commissioner has special responsibility to implement
the legislature's goal of promoting ". . . the settlement of financial
and custodial issues in a way which will meet the real needs of all
concerned persons as nearly as possible." 1977 Wis. Laws c. 105, sec 1.
See, secs. 767.23 and 767.32. Therefore, the commissioner must sometimes
function as a conciliator. Strandberg v. Strandberg, 27 Wis. 2d 559,
566, 135 N.W.2d 241 (1965).
[25] As Forsythe concedes, the commissioner has the authority to
limit recordings of proceedings when the method of recording impedes the
proceedings, in order to administer the proceedings effectively. We
conclude, however, that the responsibilities of the commissioner go
beyond a duty to conduct quiet or distraction-free proceedings, as
Forsythe argues. In addition to ensuring orderly proceedings, the
commissioner must try to bring the parties to reasonable settlements of
their differences, if possible. To do so, the commissioner must
supervise the proceedings in ways which affect their substance,
discouraging excessive behavior, encouraging appropriate resolutions of
specific issues and the like. Therefore, the administrative authority of
the commissioner must include the power to limit recording which
interferes with the achievement of reasonable settlements.
[26] The commissioner's authority is, however, not unbridled. Before
a family court commissioner may order a party to temporarily discontinue
verbatim recording of proceeding or to refrain from using a particular
method of recording, the commissioner must determine that recording at a
particular phase of the proceeding or in particular manner significantly
impedes achievement of the essential purposes of the proceeding.
Further, the commissioner must explain the limitation imposed and must
not so limit recording that the restriction impedes the party's
participation or representation.
[27] In this case the affidavit which the family court commissioner
submitted to the court sets forth the commissioner's belief that
temporary restrictions on Forsythe's verbatim recording of the
proceeding were necessary to end conduct which impeded the achievement
of a settlement of a visitation issue. The better practice would have
been for the commissioner to explain his reasons for suspending
stenographic recording to the parties at the time. Nevertheless, the
reasons which the commissioner subsequently provided satisfy the
standard which we now establish as a control on the administrative
authority of the family court commissioner. For this reason, we uphold
the circuit court's order and affirm the decision of the court of
appeals in this case.
[28] By the Court. -- Decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
[29] CASE RESOLUTION
[30] By the Court. -- Decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
IN AGREEMENT
[31] LOUIS J. CECI, J. (concurring).
[32] I agree with the court of appeals that "a person has no right to
make a transcript of the proceedings before a family court
commissioner"; I would affirm the court of appeals on that basis. I
would not extend to the parties a general right to record such
proceedings.
[33] The proceedings before a family court commissioner are usually
very informal. This informality allows the parties to release and
thereby diffuse hostile emotions, which in turn may lead to the
beneficial result of the parties' agreeing to the contents of the
commissioner's temporary order. Interposing a party's recording
mechanism adds an element of adversariness to the proceedings and makes
it more difficult for the family court commissioner to serve in his or
her role as conciliator. See, Strandberg v. Strandberg, 27 Wis. 2d 559,
566, 135 N.W.2d 241 (1965).
[34] The majority does not pretend that it derives a party's right to
record proceedings before a family court commissioner from statutory
law. I note, however, that sec. 767.13(1m), Stats., specifically gives
the moving party the right to de novo review of the family court
commissioner's "decision, order or ruling." It is at this point in the
proceedings -- when the parties are in a court of record -- that they
are entitled to make a record. To allow a party the right to record the
proceedings before the family court commissioner not only will destroy
the beneficial effects of the informal nature of the proceedings, it
also will be superfluous, given that sec. 767.13(1m) provides for de
novo review.
[35] The majority posits that the right to record the proceedings
before the family court commissioner follows from the right of public
access to court proceedings (at page 327). I am unpersuaded that the
general concept of public access to the courts supports the holding that
parties have the right to record proceedings before the family court
commissioner; I divorce myself from that reasoning.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTEHERE *****
[36] *fn1 Article VII, sec. 3(1) provides: "The supreme court shall
have superintending and administrative authority over all courts."
[37] *fn2 Section 767.13(1)(b), Stats., provides, in relevant part:
"The family court commissioner, by virtue of the office and to the
extent required for the performance of the duties, has the powers of a
court commissioner."
[38] In 1981 the rules of the circuit court for Dane county
specifically authorized the family court commissioner to conduct
postjudgment proceedings related to child custody and contempt. Dane
County Court Rules, Family Court Rule 2. The rules also specified that
parties to these proceedings had the right to a de novo hearing before a
judge on these issues. Id. See also sec. 767.13(1m), Stats.
***** END FOOTNOTEHERE *****
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http://www.versuslaw.com
19860620
1986.WI.157