[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] BELL
v.
[3] BURSON, DIRECTOR, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
[4] No. 5586
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1971.SCT.97 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[5] Date Decided: May 24, 1971
[6] SYLLABUS
[7] Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which
provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an
uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he
posts security for the amount of damages claimed by an aggrieved party
and which excludes any consideration of fault or responsibility for the
accident at a pre-suspension hearing held violative of procedural due
process. Before Georgia, whose statutory scheme significantly involves
the issue of liability, may deprive an individual of his license and
registration, it must provide a procedure for determining the question
whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered
against him as a result of the accident. Pp. 539-543.
[8] CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA.
[9] APPELLATE PANEL:
[10] Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Burger, C.
J., and Black and Blackmun, JJ., concurred in the result.
[11] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUSTICE BRENNAN
[12] Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that
the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured
motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts
security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in
reports of the accident.*fn1 The administrative hearing conducted prior
to the suspension excludes consideration of the motorist's fault or
liability for the accident. The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected
petitioner's contention that the State's statutory scheme, in failing
before suspending the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question
of his fault or liability, denied him due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment: the court held that "'Fault' or 'innocence' are
completely irrelevant factors." 121 Ga. App. 418, 420, 174 S. E. 2d
235, 236 (1970). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. App. 27. We
granted certiorari. 400 U.S. 963 (1970). We reverse.
[13] Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel
by car to cover three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday afternoon,
November 24, 1968, petitioner was involved in an accident when
five-year-old Sherry Capes rode her bicycle into the side of his
automobile. The child's parents filed an accident report with the
Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety indicating that
their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed
damages of $ 5,000. Petitioner was thereafter informed by the Director
that unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at
the time of the accident he must file a bond or cash security deposit of
$ 5,000 or present a notarized release from liability, plus proof of
future financial responsibility,*fn2 or suffer the suspension of his
driver's license and vehicle registration. App. 9. Petitioner requested
an administrative hearing before the Director asserting that he was not
liable as the accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he would
be severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by
a suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled but the Director
informed petitioner that "the only evidence that the Department can
accept and consider is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved
in the accident; (b) has petitioner complied with the provisions of the
Law as provided; or (c) does petitioner come within any of the
exceptions of the Law." App. 11.*fn3 At the administrative hearing the
Director rejected petitioner's proffer of evidence on liability,
ascertained that petitioner was not within any of the statutory
exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days to comply with the security
requirements or suffer suspension. Petitioner then exercised his
statutory right to an appeal de novo in the Superior Court. Ga. Code
Ann. § 92A-602 (1958). At that hearing, the court permitted petitioner
to present his evidence on liability, and, although the claimants were
neither parties nor witnesses, found petitioner free from fault. As a
result, the Superior Court ordered "that the petitioner's driver's
license not be suspended . . . [until] suit is filed against petitioner
for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries sustained by the
child . . . ." App. 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in overruling petitioner's constitutional contention.
[14] If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists
who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the
statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex
parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
286 U.S. 352 (1932); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). It does not
follow, however, that the amendment also permits the Georgia statutory
scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in
accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss of the
licenses. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). Once licenses are
issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses
thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This is but an application of the general
proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to
terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a
"right" or a "privilege." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(disqualification for unemployment compensation); Slochower v. Board of
Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of a tax exemption);
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra (withdrawal of welfare benefits). See also
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-386 (1908); Goldsmith v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126 (1941).
[15] We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which
must be afforded the licensee on the question of his fault or liability
for the accident.*fn4 A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in
one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every
case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not
suffice to try a felony charge. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at
270-271, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Clearly,
however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the
licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of
the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in
litigation between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only
purpose of the provisions before us is to obtain security from which to
pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we
hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited
to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of
judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee.
[16] The State argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the
suspension of his licenses is outweighed by countervailing governmental
interests and therefore that this procedural due process need not be
afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there is no reasonable
possibility of a judgment being rendered against a licensee, Georgia's
interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an
unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the State's
fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying the process due its
citizens. Nor is additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing
sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. "'While the
problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify
denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.'"
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp.
893, 901 (SDNY 1968).
[17] The main thrust of Georgia's argument is that it need not
provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are
irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We may assume that were this so, the
prior administrative hearing presently provided by the State would be
"appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). But "in reviewing state action in
this area . . . we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine
whether constitutional minimums have been honored." Willner v. Committee
on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 106-107 (1963) (concurring opinion). And
looking to the operation of the State's statutory scheme, it is clear
that liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of
responsibility, plays a crucial role in the Safety Responsibility Act.
If prior to suspension there is a release from liability executed by the
injured party, no suspension is worked by the Act. Ga. Code Ann. 92A-606
(1958). The same is true if prior to suspension there is an adjudication
of nonliability. Ibid. Even after suspension has been declared, a
release from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the
suspension. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1970). Moreover, other of the
Act's exceptions are developed around liability-related concepts. Thus,
we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme. Since the statutory
scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination
to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not,
consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in
its prior hearing.
[18] The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be
"meaningful," Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), and
"appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., supra, at 313. It is a proposition which hardly seems to
need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an
element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here
involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.
[19] Finally, we reject Georgia's argument that if it must afford the
licensee an inquiry into the question of liability, that determination,
unlike the determination of the matters presently considered at the
administrative hearing, need not be made prior to the suspension of the
licenses. While "many controversies have raged about . . . the Due
Process Clause," ibid., it is fundamental that except in emergency
situations (and this is not one)*fn5 due process requires that when a
State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must
afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case" before the termination becomes effective. Ibid. Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S., at 152-156; Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971).
[20] We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme,
before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver's license and
vehicle registration it must provide a forum for the determination of
the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment
being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it
inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this requirement.
The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia may decide
merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative
hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a consideration
to the de novo judicial proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may
decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for
damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to
abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various
alternatives in force in other States.*fn6 Finally, Georgia may reject
all of the above and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The area
of choice is wide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia
scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability of the
nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
[21] The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[22] It is so ordered.
[23] THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
concur in the result.
[24] CASE RESOLUTION
[25] 121 Ga. App. 418, 174 S. E. 2d 235, reversed and remanded.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTEHERE *****
[26] *fn1 Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga. Code Ann. §
92A-601 et seq. (1958). In pertinent part the Act provides that anyone
involved in an accident must submit a report to the Director of Public
Safety. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-604 (Supp. 1970). Within 30 days of the
receipt of the report the Director "shall suspend the license and all
registration certificates and all registration plates of the operator
and owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the accident
unless or until the operator or owner has previously furnished or
immediately furnishes security, sufficient . . . to satisfy any
judgments for damages or injuries resulting . . . and unless such
operator or owner shall give proof of financial responsibility for the
future as is required in section 92A-615.1. . . ." Ga. Code Ann. §
92A-605 (a) (Supp. 1970). Section 92A-615.1 (Supp. 1970) requires that
"such proof must be maintained for a one-year period." Section 92A-605
(a) works no suspension, however, (1) if the owner or operator had in
effect at the time of the accident a liability insurance policy or other
bond, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (c) (Supp. 1970); (2) if the owner or
operator qualifies as a self-insurer, ibid.; (3) if only the owner or
operator was injured, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958); (4) if the
automobile was legally parked at the time of the accident, ibid.; (5) if
as to an owner, the automobile was being operated without permission,
ibid.; or (6) "if, prior to the date that the Director would otherwise
suspend license and registration . . . there shall be filed with the
Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would
otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or been
finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged
written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in
installments . . . ." Ibid.
[27] *fn2 Questions concerning the requirement of proof of future
financial responsibility are not before us. The State's brief, at 4,
states: "The one year period for proof of financial responsibility has
now expired, so [petitioner] would not be required to file such proof,
even if the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed."
[28] *fn3 Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958) provides:
[29] "The Director shall administer and enforce the provisions of
this Chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its
administration and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons
aggrieved by orders or acts of the Director under the provisions of this
Chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter of record and the decision as
rendered by the Director shall be final unless the aggrieved person
shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to enter
an appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, by
notice to the Director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from
the court of ordinary, except that the appellant shall not be required
to post any bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person
desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or
before a jury at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de
novo, however, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any orders
or acts of the Director, nor shall the appellant be allowed to operate
or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any suspension
or revocation by the Director, while such appeal is pending. A notice
sent by registered mail shall be sufficient service on the Director that
such appeal has been entered."
[30] *fn4 Petitioner stated at oral argument that while "it would be
possible to raise [an equal protection argument] . . . we don't raise
this point here." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.
[31] *fn5 See, e. g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Ewing
v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
[32] *fn6 The various alternatives include compulsory insurance
plans, public or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and
assigned claims plans. See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, After Cars Crash
(1967).
***** END FOOTNOTEHERE *****
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1971.SCT.97