10/23/69 WATERMAN STEAMSHIP v. Marcus J. CASBON, Ryan
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[2] WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION and Waterman of Puerto Rico,
[3] USA, Inc., Appellants,
v.
[4] Marcus J. CASBON, Ryan Stevedoring Company, and the
[5] Travelers Insurance Company, Appellees. Marcus J.
[6] CASBON, Ryan Stevedoring Company, and the
[7] Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants,
[8] v. WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION
[9] and Waterman of Puerto Rico,
[10] USA, Inc., Appellees
[11] No. 25690
[12] 417 F.2d 1040
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1969.C05.1275 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[13] APPELLATE PANEL:
[14] John R. Brown, Chief Judge, Thornberry, Circuit Judge, and
Taylor, District Judge.
[15] PER CURIAM DECISION
[16] The facts of this case with all of the contradictions and
inconsistencies typical of a fracas, whether land-based, waterborne, or
amphibious, are set forth in the District Court's opinion, Casbon v.
Waterman Steamship Corporation, E.D.La., 1967, 274 F. Supp. 481.
Whatever doubts there might be concerning liability based upon
unseaworthiness from the pugnacious predisposition of the night mate,
there was adequate basis under Jamison v. Encarnacion, 1930, 281 U.S.
635, 50 S. Ct. 440, 74 L. Ed. 1082, for concluding that the night mate
considered himself to be exerting discipline and command within the
confines of his jurisdiction so that misuse of excessive force
constituted negligence for which the shipowner was responsible. The
District Judge's fact conclusions pass muster under F.R.Civ.P. 52(a),
and the resulting judgment is amply supported on legal principles. That
includes the denial of recovery over against the stevedore and the cross
appeal complaining of the damage award.
[17] Affirmed.
[18] CASE RESOLUTION
[19] Affirmed.
[20] James W. RANKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
[21] STATE OF FLORIDA et al., Defendant-Appellee
[22] No. 27064 Summary Calendar
[23] 418 F.2d 482
[24] Rehearing Denied November 26, 1969.
[25] Thornberry, Morgan and Carswell, Circuit Judges.
[26] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MORGAN
[27] LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge.
[28] Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules of this court, we have
concluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not to
justify oral argument and have directed the clerk to place the case on
the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties in writing. See Murphy v.
Houma Well Service, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 804, Part I.
[29] This is an appeal from an order of dismissal entered by the
District Court of the Southern District of Florida in a class action
brought pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act challenging the
constitutionality of Florida Statute, Section 99.161, F.S.A., n1 which
prohibits political contributions by persons licensed by the State to
sell alcoholic beverages. The State's motion to dismiss was granted on
the ground that the federal issues presented in this case had been
presented, litigated, and decided previously in the Florida courts.
[30] On December 6, 1966, a class action on behalf of all persons
licensed by the State of Florida to sell intoxicating beverages (styled
Sutton v. Adams) was brought in a Florida Circuit Court against the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State of Florida to declare that
"Florida Statute 99.161(1) (b) is in conflict with the Constitution of
the State of Florida . . . and/or with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and that Section 99.161(1) (b) is
unconstitutional, null, void and unenforceable". n2 The instant
declaratory judgment action was commenced in federal district court on
December 30, 1966, and seeks to have Section 99.161(1) (b) declared to
be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. n3
The federal complaint was later amended into a class action in behalf of
all holders of licenses issued by the State of Florida permitting the
sale of intoxicating beverages. The same attorneys that represented the
named plaintiff in the state action represent the named plaintiff in
this action.
[31] The Florida Circuit Court held Section 99.161(1) (b)
unconstitutional on October 5, 1967 on the ground that a 1965 amendment
exempting "members of country clubs, fraternal, social, and cultural
organizations" from the operation of the statute was not a reasonable
classification. However, the state court did not indicate whether it was
relying on the Florida Constitution or the U.S. Constitution, or both,
in reaching its decision.
[32] On October 13, 1967, the plaintiff in the federal action filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Florida Circuit Court had
declared Section 99.161(1) (b) unconstitutional on grounds similar to
those set forth in the federal complaint. This motion was withdrawn on
October 30, 1967. On June 5, 1968, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
the decree of the Circuit Court and held that there was a reasonable
relationship between the purpose of Section 99.161(1) (b) and the groups
excluded from its operation. (Adams v. Sutton, Fla. 1968, 212 So.2d 1.)
[33] In ordering the cause dismissed, the District Court in effect
held (1) that the plaintiffs in the state and federal actions, being
members of the same class and being represented by the same counsel,
were identical; (2) that the federal constitutional issues were
presented and argued without reservation before and decided by the
Florida courts; and (3) that by pursuing their remedy unreservedly in
state court, the plaintiffs elected to be bound by the state court on
the federal constitutional issues, and that abstention by the federal
courts is in order in such a case, particularly in view of the
plaintiffs' election to appeal the state action to the United States
Supreme Court, relying on England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S. Ct. 461, 11 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1964) and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).
[34] The appellant here contends that the District Court committed
error in dismissing the federal action on the basis of the Abstention
Doctrine because: (1) the federal constitutional issues were not
litigated or decided by the state courts nor presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court on appeal; n4 (2) the federal action and the state
action did not present identical issues; and (3) the plaintiff in the
federal class action cannot be bound by the outcome of the class action
brought in state court.
[35] The issue thus before the Court is whether the District Court
was correct in dismissing the federal action after the state action had
become final. We hold that the District Court was correct and affirm.
[36] Although the District Court below invoked the Abstention
Doctrine as the basis for the dismissal, the situation presented does
not fall neatly into the Abstention mold. Generally, the Abstention
Doctrine refers to a postponement of litigation in District Court in a
case involving both federal and state questions in order to allow the
parties to obtain a final adjudication of the state questions in the
state courts before the federal issues are decided in federal court. See
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177, 79 S. Ct. 1025, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1152,
1158 (1959); Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25, 29, 79 S. Ct. 1070, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1058, 1062 (1959); Wright,
Federal Courts, Sec. 52, p. 169 (1963 ed.). In the present situation,
the same cause of action, involving both state and federal
constitutional issues, was brought almost simultaneously in both state
and federal courts by different members of the same class acting in
concert. The state action was litigated first and the plaintiff argued
both state and federal constitutional points without any reservation
(although as a matter of tactics the plaintiff refrained from making a
general attack on Section 99.161 on federal constitutional grounds). The
decision of the state trial court was favorable to the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff in the federal action moved to dismiss the federal action.
However, the motion was withdrawn when it became apparent that the state
decision was to be appealed. The plaintiff lost in the Florida Supreme
Court (Sutton v. Adams, supra) and now seek a readjudication on the
merits in federal district court. At this point the situation becomes
similar to abstention cases where the parties file in federal court and,
when sent to state court, litigate the federal issues without
reservation, and then seek to return to district court after the state
court disposes of all the issues presented. In England v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners, supra, the United States Supreme Court
said:
[37] We see no reason why a party, after unreservedly litigating his
federal claims in the state courts although not required to do so,
should be allowed to ignore the adverse state decision and start all
over again in the District Court. Such a rule would not only countenance
an unnecessary increase in the length and cost of litigation; it would
also be a potential source of friction between the state and federal
judiciaries. We implicitly rejected such a rule in Button, when we
stated that a party elects to forego his right to return to the District
Court by a decision "to seek a complete and final adjudication of his
rights in the state courts". We now explicitly hold that if a party
freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision
by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there,
then -- whether or not he seeks direct review of the state decision in
this Court -- he has elected to forego his right to the District Court.
375 U.S. at 419, 84 S. Ct. at 466-467.
[38] The District Court's reliance on England, which infused
well-known principles of res judicata into the arena of abstention, is
well placed. The doctrine of res judicata provides that, if a previous
judgment is valid, and on the merits, it is an absolute bar in another
case on the same cause of action between the same parties and their
privies not only in respect of every grounds of recovery or defense
which were presented but also as to every ground of recovery or defense
which might have been presented. Acree v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 5 Cir.,
1968, 390 F.2d 199; See Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 5
Cir., 1966, 363 F.2d 861.
[39] The plaintiff in the federal class action is therefore barred
from litigating further in federal court by the final determination of
the state class action, since the parties and issues were identical in
substance, if not in form. Acree v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, supra. The
order of the District Court dismissing the plaintiff's case is
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTEHERE *****
[40] n1 The relevant part of F.S. 99.161 provides:
[41] "(1) (b) No person holding a license for the sale of
intoxicating beverages, nor any member of an unincorporated association
holding such a license, nor any officer or director or a corporation
holding such a license, shall make, directly or indirectly, any
contribution of any nature to any political party or to any candidate
for nomination for, or election to, any political office in the state;
providing, however, that these prohibitions shall not apply to members
of country clubs, fraternal, social and cultural organizations."
[42] Penalties for violation of F.S. 99.161 (1) (b), F.S.A., are
stated in F.S. 104.27, F.S.A., and include fine and imprisonment as well
as revocation of the license.
[43] n2 Specifically, the complaint in the state action alleged that
Section 99.161(1) (b) F.S.A. is violative of the Florida Constitution or
the U.S. Constitution in the following respects:
[44] 1. Section 99.161(1) (b) discriminates against liquor licensees
because businessmen in other fields are allowed to make political
contributions;
[45] 2. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies liquor licensees equality before
the law under Section 1 of the Florida Declaration of Rights;
[46] 3. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies freedom of speech;
[47] 4. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies liquor licensees their right of
assembly under Section 15, Florida Declaration of Rights;
[48] 5. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies liquor licensees rights as an
elector under Section 1, Article VI, Florida Constitution;
[49] 6. Section 99.161(1) (b) is unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous;
[50] 7. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies equal protection of the laws by
restricting plaintiffs' right to vote and support the candidate of his
choice, or political party of his choice by limiting his right to vote
to the actual casting of his ballot without a reasonable basis and
without reasonable classification contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
[51] n3 The complaint in the federal action advanced the following
reasons that Section 99.161(1) (b) is unconstitutional:
[52] 1. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies due process of law by
restraining without reason the plaintiffs from fully exercising their
right to vote and contribute to the candidate or political party of
their choice;
[53] 2. Section 99.161(1) (b) discriminates against plaintiffs in
their right to work and deprives them of property without due process of
law;
[54] 3. There is no reasonable relationship between the prohibition
of Section 99.161(1) (b) and the exercise of the police power;
[55] 4. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies equal protection of the law by
making an exception for liquor licensees who are members of certain
organizations;
[56] 5. Section 99.161(1) (b) denies equal protection of the laws by
limiting the plaintiffs' participation in supporting the political party
of his choice in such manner as is provided by the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act of 1966;
[57] 6. Section 99.161(1) (b) deprives the plaintiffs of their right
to contribute to the political candidate and party of their choice and
to exercise fully the right to vote and to speak freely in the election.
[58] n4 Appellant argues that the federal constitutional attack on
Section 99.161(1) (b) in the state action was limited to whether the
exception for members of certain organizations imbodied in the 1965
Amendment constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment and that no general federal attack was made in
state court since it would have been useless in light of Smith v. Ervin,
Fla., 1953, 64 So.2d 166, which upheld Section 99.161 in the face of a
general constitutional attack.
***** END FOOTNOTEHERE *****
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available in the print version]
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19691023
1969.C05.1275